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1. Introduction
In the lyrics written by Sid Tepper and Roy C. Bennett of a popular 1948 song, a broken-hearted
guy, who had the day before argued with his girlfriend, rushed to the florist to buy some “red
roses for a blue lady”. His hope was that those pretty flowers could chase her blues away. In
short, he wished some red flowers could compensate for the damage he had caused to his
lover’s heart.
Likewise, climate policy has recently1 come up with the REDD mechanism (Reduced Emissions
from Deforestation and forest Degradation) to protect natural standing forests before they are
damaged by deforestation or degradation. Within the REDD framework, carbon credits can
be earned for deforestation avoidance, rather than as in forestry CDM (Clean Development
Mechanism), for afforestation or reforestation.
Since deforestation gives off nearly one-fifth (1.6 Gt) of global carbon emissions [2], avoiding
it is claimed to be the most effective and cheapest way of control. However, until recently
deforestation avoidance had been kept out of international climate accords, mainly because of
1 The first time REDD came into the UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) agenda was
in 2005, when a mechanism for reducing deforestation and forest degradation was proposed by Papua New Guinea,
Costa Rica and eight other countries. Two years earlier, Brazilian researchers had already come up with a similar tool
backed by international payments for reduced deforestation. Between the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Bali,
Indonesia, in 2007 (COP-13), and in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 2009 (COP-15), different REDD proposals emerged. As
the scope of the mechanism was getting wider, its abbreviation was getting longer with the addition of “D’s” and plus
(+) signs. Chronologically, it started with RED — short for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation; next, it became REDD
— when forest Degradation was added; then, it turned out to be REDD+ — so as to encompass conservation and
enhancement of forest stocks through Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) techniques; at present, it has often been
labelled REDD++, including reforestation and afforestation — that is, reforestation of non-forested areas [1]. Throughout
this chapter, simply REDD will be employed, regardless of its several chronological meanings. However, afforestation
and reforestation will be considered to fall into forestry-CDM — the branch of the Clean Development Mechanism suited
to unnatural forests.
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the fear that credits supplied in return could flood carbon markets, thereby lowering the price
of carbon credits [2]. But, with the closing, in 2012, of the first commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol (2008-2012), avoiding deforestation has been taken up as a post-2012 proposal for an
international agreement that might bring in developing (non-Annex I) countries also to comply
with emission targets.
Although the forest conservation feature of REDD means a step forward regarding carbon
offsets from either energy or forestry-CDM [3], the credits arising from avoiding deforestation
sound like roses offered as rewards for not causing damages to any “green lady” (forest).
However, public incentive systems seldom pay people for not doing something — in the case
of REDD, for not deforesting or not degrading. Hence, since a reward means a payment due
for not doing something, it might encourage people to do what is already forbidden. In
addition, it could make room for compensation seekers, whose anti-social and imprudent
behaviour would otherwise have been inhibited by moral or legal censure [4].
Anyway, such a reward largely rests upon the creation of a market for REDD credits, in which
Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) are made to landowners and users, to compensate
them for keeping forests — which are worth more alive than dead. PES schemes are defined
as voluntary, conditional transactions — the payment is only made if the service is delivered
— with at least one seller, one buyer, and a well-defined environmental service [2]. However,
none of these conditions are yet in place in most REDD countries: the commodity is hard to
quantify, the sellers are not well defined, big buyers do not exist and the rules of the game are
not well established [5].
Besides these practical hindrances, REDD architecture is not without ideological critiques.
Polanyi’s [6] followers have charged not only REDD with having a privatising and marketing
nature, but also PES with allowing elites and large-scale commercial actors to profit from what
is called “forest capitalism”. The gist of the criticism is that the largest share of deforestation
is carried out by larger and wealthier players than by the poor, who REDD notwithstanding
claims to be the greatest beneficiaries of the payments for avoiding deforestation [5]. Thus, of
course, the bulk of these reward payments is expected to go to the players whose monetary
foregone benefits are the greatest, when deforestation is halted.
Another pitfall of REDD and PES is that they rely too much on financial support. Although
forests are assigned a high value in public debate, the relatively low returns accruing to forest
management are due to the many and diverse non-financial benefits that forests can provide
[7]. Both global REDD regimes and national REDD strategies call for the provision of financial
resources — in the form of compensation or incentive payments — to alter the political
economy of commercial access to forest resources [2]. Yet, REDD finance hinges on political
will, institutional settings and long bureaucratic chains to work properly [2], [5].
At the national level, REDD policies demand the removal of support and subsidies for
companies or activities that increase the pressure towards forest conversion — agricultural
expansion, destructive logging, settlement schemes, plantation and road development in forest
areas [2]. At the international level, a large proportion of finance will need to come from
developed countries. Therefore, the scale of such finance will depend on the political will
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within these countries [5]. Nevertheless, developed countries are not likely to transfer
payments to fragile states, where long-term efforts would be required to create or reform
institutions, strengthen governance processes and build capacity to deal with the new models
of forest management underlying REDD policies [2].
In any event, disturbances of this sort rest not only upon the promise to serve different actors
and interests, but also upon that to bridge the environment and development agendas. While
this proposal sounds so appealing and distinct from past efforts in the forestry sector, it not
only has turned REDD into a successful idea, but also made it move from single (carbon) to
multiple objectives. Such a move, though, is now threatening and overshadowing the main
characteristic of REDD, which comes down to large-scale funding and performance-based
support. So far, the vast majority of both developed and developing countries lack concrete
strategies on how to implement REDD. Therefore, REDD finance remains unresolved, because
the cost of reducing emissions from deforestation also depends on the strategy chosen [5].
Arguably, new strategies must emphasise carbon-stock protection [2]. Many studies have
indicated that, after wood production, carbon sequestration is the most valuable output from
forests [7]. However, a conservation market (REDD credits) for forest protection should draw
on a form of compensation for producing something additional (new carbon stored), rather
than on a reward for “not doing something” (not deforesting or not degrading) [4]. To begin
with, this is supposed to help the political economy of REDD build the argument for its public
support [4], thus allaying the mistrust that lurks over it of rewarding the wealthiest forest users.
A further step towards that shift lies in emphasising a stock maintenance rather than an emissions
avoidance approach. This turns carbon conservation strategies from output (performance) into
input-driven ones. After all, forest sequestration of carbon emissions is primarily a matter of
forestland availability rather than of emissions avoided. If forest stocks are maintained or even
increased, they do not emit carbon, which is kept there. Although this might sound like a “two-
sides-of-the-same-coin” problem, the stock maintenance approach highlights the positive side
of conservation — the stewardship of carbon stocks — whereas the emissions avoidance
approach stresses its negative side — the discouragement or closure of activities causing
emissions to rise in spite of delivering economic benefits. Quite often, the latter is seen as an
unproductive strategy while the former might well evoke the production of some useful
commodity.
The commodity at stake is carbon storage rather than money. Yet, REDD finance claims that
economic and monetary incentives can, through price signals, alter the decisions of individual
land users and compensate them for foregone benefits from not converting or degrading the
forest [2]. Since carbon storage is increasingly needed, the demand for carbon credits is
expected to go up, thereby generating finance for forest conservation [5]. At present, however,
there is deep uncertainty as to whether and how a future international climate agreement
would value carbon sequestration provided by forests. In addition, when standing forests
compete with high-value agricultural and mining commodities, no one can ensure anymore
whether and how REDD funding — particularly output, results-based finance — would be
available in the future. So far, from current REDD finance, it is widely recognised that more
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money alone cannot solve the deforestation problem and that the expectations of more money
can even make it worse [8].
As argued elsewhere [3], [9], [10], since the ascent of money in modern societies, a commun‐
ity’s wealth now has two components: real goods, accumulated through real investments,
and fiat or paper “goods”, made of nothing. Unlike the former, the latter kind of wealth is
not subject to the natural law of decrease, the entropy law. Whereas the accumulation of
real goods, which hold use value, does meet physical limits, there is no limit at all to the
accumulation of “virtual wealth” [10], used for exchange only [9]. So, in this world, where
the substance is  exchanged for the shadow, what determines the value of  money is  the
amount of wealth people prefer to do without, and that is the same as the amount of credit
they retain as money [10]. In monetary economies, the greater this “virtual wealth” is, the
higher the price of the real goods it can afford; conversely, the smaller the former, the lower
the latter2. It is puzzling how the protection of environmental goods and services should be
commanded by such a virtual wealth rationale [3], [9].
In this regard, a non-monetary Bio-Economic model for carbon Sequestration by Forests (BESF)
[3] is applied to a deforestation scenario taking place in the Brazilian “Legal Amazon” region
(Amazônia Legal, Figure 1), to show how forest stocks can be prevented from being degraded.
After all, if these stocks wither away, they will no longer be able to store carbon emissions. The
model assumes that the growth of natural stocks follows an upper limited path. Therefore, if
emissions from economic growth (k) have to be taken in by standing natural forests, their stocks
could not fall below a certain limit. Those forest storage and tree growth constraints cap
emissions.
Building upon fishery and forest bio-economics, in the BESF model emitters play the catchers,
whereas natural forests supply the catch — namely, the environmental service of emissions
storage. But unlike in fishery and forest models, the “catch”, in this case, is an input rather
than an output. As emissions increase, so does the demand for their storage, and the supply
of forest stocks goes down. Thus, forest stocks turn out to be priced biophysically rather than
monetarily.
Such a biophysically set price is called the bio-economic exchange rate (ε). Found by dynamic
optimisation methods, it works as a shadow price measuring the shortage of the environmental
input (carbon removal) on demand. At any given time, the more (less) this service is demanded,
the less (more) of it is carried over into the future. However, the supply of current removal
stocks varies across the carbon sinks. Such spatial differences, measured by the bio-diversity
ratio λ, are called “exports” (Z) of carbon removal to elsewhere and correspond to conservation
2 In monetary economics, this relationship is known as the “quantity theory of money”. “The quantity theory is a
mechanistic proposition strangely alien to the assumptions of rational maximising behaviour on which classical and
neoclassical theories generally rely ... It ignores the effects of the returns to holding money on the amounts economic
agents choose to hold ... Money holdings depend ... on the opportunity costs, the expected changes in the value of
money and the real yields of other assets into which the same funds could be placed” [11]. Of course, these remarks
follow a Keynesian theoretical tradition, within which money is thought to be an asset rather than a token of bank
liabilities  to  current  account  holders.  Taking  money  as  liabilities  dates  back  to  the  days  when  bank-notes  were
“promises to pay”, handed over at once as a receipt to depositors who had voluntarily given up gold to the bank,
which, in turn, promised to repay them on demand [10].
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loans (REDD credits) between carbon sinks. On the other hand, the provision of such an
environmental service in the future is “imported” (borrowed) from the savings of removal
stocks that happened in the past. Therefore, these transfers of carbon removal over time are
called “imports” (M) and are referred to as compensation loans (CDM offsets) between the sinks.
 
 
(*) Prodes Project — Satellite-borne monitoring of the Brazilian Amazon Rainforest [23]  
ε ε
ε
ε
ε
λ ε
ε
State capital 
Deforest. until 2012 (Prodes*)
Legal Amazon boundary 
State border 
(*) Prodes Project — Satellite-borne monitoring of the Brazilian Amazon Rainforest [23]; Source: [12]
Figure 1. Deforestation accumulated until 2012 in the Brazilian Legal Amazon
Whereas Z means that the ecological burden of removing carbon emissions is “exported” to
elsewhere, M implies carrying the ecological burden within an economy’s boundaries over
time [3]. The former translates into an ecological credit (0 < ε < 1) and the latter into an ecological
debt (ε > 1).
When conservation is low (high), compensation is supposed to decrease (increase), unless ε
depreciates (appreciates). Since ε exchanges future carbon removal stocks (M) for current ones
(Z), its rise (depreciation) means that Z is relatively deteriorating, whereas its fall (appreciation)
means that Z is relatively increasing. Otherwise, for a given ε, Z and M vary positively with it
(Figure 2.b).
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Just like bond markets are grounded in existing loan supply (savings) and demand (invest‐
ment), removal loans for either carbon conservation or compensation are backed up by the
biological growth of actual stocks (removal supply) of forest sinks set aside for curbing
emissions from economic growth (removal demand). Forest-wide, Z grows with λ, whose
growth, in turn, causes ε to fall (appreciate). On the other hand, the faster (slower) the speed
k of economic activity, the greater (smaller) the demand for M and the depreciation (rise) of
ε should be. Hence, at this forestland level of aggregation, ε is a negative function of the spatial
distribution of carbon sinks (λ) and a positive function of emissions given off by the growth
of the economy over time (k) (Figure 2.a).
The objective of probing these relationships is to demonstrate that the macro-scale determi‐
nation of ε (Figure 2.a) can help find: a) the optimal supply of conservation and compensation
in the loan market for carbon removal (Figure 2.b); b) biophysically attainable deforestation
targets at the micro-scale (Figure 2.c), according to the rates at which emissions from economic
growth (ln k) are given off and the ratio of forest to deforested land— the bio-diversity ratio
— varies (ln λ).This analysis will be carried out for three scenarios:
i. BAU (Business-As-Usual), in which ln k > ln λ;
ii. REDD, in which ln k < ln λ;
iii. CDM, in which ln k = ln λ.
To start with, the methodology sections will describe the BESF model, its geometry, basic
assumptions, parameters, functions and variables. After that, empirical data on deforestation
in Brazilian Amazonia will be used to account for the model equilibrium points — both at the
micro  and  macro-scale.  Finally,  the  aforementioned  three  scenarios  will  be  assessed  to
determine, for either of them, how much forestland would have to be used for conservation
(REDD) and for offsetting carbon emissions (CDM). According to this allocation,  carbon
sequestration provided by forests could be “paid” at its real, biophysical value, rather than
according to the virtual monetary benefits such an environmental service is supposed to deliver.
2. Research question and analytical framework
The creation of a market for carbon is based on the assumption that monetary payments for
carbon storage might make economic agents opt for forest conservation rather than forest
conversion [4]. Although such payments might sound like a working solution, the heavier any
forest-related decision falls back on them, the lighter it is supposed to lean on its biophysical
and environmental footings. Thus, how should a market fit into turning this logic upside-
down? Put differently, how could ecosystem services, such as carbon sequestration, be priced
biophysically rather than monetarily? What does that mean? How would it work?
The answers to whether prices can be equated with value or considered only indirect means
of measuring values [13] rest upon the proposition that economic value should not be reduced
to an ultimate one dimensional gauge, as held by the labour, utility and energy theories of
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value3. Economic value should be thought of as not bearing a single substance out of which it
should be drawn or within which it should be found. In a biophysical sense, value is limited
to the degree to which an item contributes to an objective or condition in an ecosystem [16].
For instance, the biophysical value of a tree species could come from its contribution to
controlling soil erosion in steeply sloped areas [16]. Elsewhere, the same tree species might be
worth for, say, sequestering carbon. So, although the tree species has not changed, the
substance or content from which its value is drawn has.
Furthermore, just like man cannot reach too deep into the material microcosm [13], he is
likely unable to search too deeply for the one and only source of economic value. According
to the Heisenberg principle of indeterminacy in quantum physics, and given the high com‐
plexity of microstructures, the probability of, say, building a living cell from scratch is ex‐
tremely small [13]. By the same token, the probability of drawing economic value out of a
single underlying source is very low.
Within the economy’s biophysical realms, useful goods and services should be valued by their
usefulness4 rather than by their exchange properties. What is meant by “usefulness” builds on
Daly’s [18] notion of ultimate efficiency, defined as the ratio of service to throughput. The
services yielded by the stocks of artefacts are the ultimate benefit of economic activity. The
throughput is the inevitable cost of maintaining the stocks of people and artefacts. Thus, in the
3 Dating back to classical times, the labour theory of value paradoxically stated that only when land (natural resources)
is (are) running out is the maximum value reached. Therefore, any natural resource that gets into the market and thus
acquires exchange value is dying out or close to extinction. So, exchange value lays bare that there is less of that natural
resource than there was when it held no value at all! Later on, the neoclassical utility theory displaced the economic value
to an even odder container: consumption. In the “utility world”, the economic value was placed in the individual
preferences for commodities. As preferences were a subjective matter, the economic value then turned out to rest upon
the abstract basis of utility. From then on, the economic analysis has been cut off from its biophysical roots [14]. But as
early as 1883, S. Podolinsky pioneered the idea of associating energy with value, as claimed by energy theories of value.
These theories aimed at substituting energy for money as the only source of value. However, money is not particularly
correlated with energy content, because there is no direct equivalence between low entropy and economic value [13][15].
For instance, the monetary value per unit energy content of a diamond is extremely large compared to the monetary
value per unit energy content of a lump of coal. Nonetheless, if all indirect energy flows were to be tracked down and
accounted for, the discrepancy between diamonds and coal might not be so great [15]. By and large, economists have
rebutted these energy evaluation methods because of the fear that economics might end up turning into a branch of
thermodynamics [14]. Furthermore, as Georgescu-Roegen [13] once pointed out, the economic process has only two flows:
an input flow of low entropy and an output flow of high entropy, namely, waste. If the balance sheet of value should be
set on the basis of these inputs and outputs, one “would arrive at the absurd conclusion that the value of the low entropy
flow on which the maintenance of life itself depends is equal to the value of the flow of waste, that is, zero” (p. 284). This
paradox only vanishes by acknowledging that the true “product” of the economic process is not a material flow, but a
psychic flux — the enjoyment of life. Thus, the economic value has both psychic (neoclassical) and physical (classical)
roots. An entropy-oriented, energy theory of value would only account for the supply side of the process and neglect the
corresponding demand side [9]. That is why the proposition of a shadow price for natural resource inputs, on one hand,
and for the waste sinking capacity of the environment, on the other, results from an economic rather than from an energy
theory of value [14].
4 Although nature might well have other values — existence and bequeath — than use ones, non-use values are harder
to estimate. Obviously, the use value is the one arising from the real — direct, indirect or optional — use of a given
resource, whether in the present or in the future. On the other hand, the existence value is simply related to the existence
of specific riches. The bequeath value measures the benefit that any individual obtains from knowing that, in the future,
other people will also be able to benefit from the resource they have been left [17]. First and foremost, both non-use values
essentially depend on estimating the preferences of future generations, which is not that easy to foreshadow. Moreover,
non-use values resemble very much the intrinsic value of nature, which was claimed by Deep Ecology followers.
According to them, nature had to be preserved for itself, rather than for satisfying the well-being of present and future
generations. The intrinsic value is fully separated from any use value, even in the future [14]. Once these non-use concepts
are difficult to apply, environmental goods and services are taken up thereafter in their usefulness sense.
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final analysis, the stock of physical wealth is an accumulated flow of throughput, which is a
cost to be minimised [18].
Likewise, if carbon removal is the service to be used, then it must be valued by the biophysical
cost of delivering carbon removal stocks. Yet if not technically estimating price or value, a
method that estimates costs should at least be a fairly good approximation to price and value,
when markets are in equilibrium [16]. As known, whenever a commodity has a much higher
value than its cost of production, its profits will be higher. The commodity will then be
produced with increasing marginal costs until cost just equals price and profits are zero. The
opposite happens when the commodity cost is much higher than its value. Since the com‐
modity profits are lower, it will not be produced. The marginal costs then decrease until cost
and price are equal.
As real markets are seldom in equilibrium, cost and price are expected to diverge, so that
commodities could become overpriced or underpriced. The shadow price ε = M ÷ Z, calculated
by the BESF model, is the biophysical sign of that distortion. It informs how far or close the
growth rates of the economy's emissions (ln k) and of the forest stocks to remove them (ln λ)
are from each other (Figure 2.a). As explained before, the greater λ is, the larger Z will be,
which, ceteris paribus, makes ε go down (appreciate); on the other hand, the greater k is, the
larger M will be, which, ceteris paribus, makes ε go up (depreciate). The optimal balance
between k and λ defines not only ε*, in Figure 2.a, but also the optimal level of carbon conser‐
vation (Z*) and compensation (M*), in Figure 2.b, as well as the optimal growth (G(Xt)) of and
demand (ht) for carbon removal stocks (Xt), in Figure 2.c. Hence, any bio-economic distortion
in carbon prices is communicated by the bio-economic exchange rate ε.
 
 
Z, M 
ε 
lnλ 
lnk 
ε 
Z 
M 
ε0 ε1 ε* 
ε* 
0 
0 ε0 ε1 
Z* 
M* 
lnλ0 
lnk0 lnλ 
lnk 
ht 
0 Xt 
G(Xt) 
ht 
(a) Removal market for carbon 
(b) Loan market for carbon 
(c) 
Z1= M1 
Z0= M0 
lnλ*= lnk* 
G(Xt) 
Figure 2. Loan and removal markets for carbon
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For instance, given the hypothetical functional forms shown in Figure 2, ε*, found in Figure
2.a, requires carbon conservation (Z*) to be greater than carbon compensation (M*), in Figure
2.b. Similarly, as ε* was the outcome of a specific value taken on by λ and k, this bio-diversity
ratio (λ*) and economic growth rate (k*) will then be applied to yield the curves depicted by
Figure 2.c. It is these curves that set optimal deforestation targets and rates if forestland is split
into deforested (u) and conserved (v) patches.
3. Model assumptions
Figure 2.c draws on bio-economic models, such as forestry and fishery models, which are
concerned with the age and size of their biomass stocks (trees and fish) [3][19]. As the growth
of a forest depends on the age of its trees, forestry models consider the time at which the
maximum biological growth — or Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) — will be reached. In
contrast, since fish growth depends on the size instead of on the age of fish stocks, fishery models
involve the stock size at which the Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) will be attained [3].
Despite their different biological and economic emphasis, both such models are concerned
with the output (trees and fish) provided by the corresponding natural source (forests and
oceans). Neither of them, though, cares about the input — environmental service — supplied
by the natural sink upon which the corresponding resource stock grows. Therefore, in the BESF
model, the biomass stock is an input rendering an environmental service (carbon removal),
instead of an output yielding biological (MSY) and economic (MEY) gains [3].
In this case, the stock harvested (h^ t) stands for the throughput of emissions removal — or the
environmental cost of storing in the forest biomass the emissions given off by the production
and consumption of the economy's output. Provided that emissions from economic growth
have to be removed by natural standing forests, the supply of removal forest stocks (G^(X t))
need to meet an upper boundary (Kh) somewhere, since tree growth typically has an upper
bound [3].
4. Model parameters and variables
Such an upper bound (Kh) depends both on space (λ) and time-related (k) variables (Table 1
and Table 2). On one hand, Kh is a function of λt (Eq. (3)) — the spatial distribution of forest
biomass Xt(Eq. (1)), in GtC, between j = 1,..., n conserved (v) and deforested (u) sinks at each
time period t = 1,..., m, where u = (u1, u2,..., um) = (x11, x21,..., xm1); v = (v1, v2,..., vm) = (x1n, x2n,...,
xmn); u < v; xtj = carbon-equivalent emissions by sources at time t to be stored (removed) by
sink j. On the other hand, the distribution of forest biomass is highly affected by economic
activity and the rate at which land-use changes take place. In other words, λt depends on kj
(Eq. (12)) — which measures emissions from deforestation or carbon emissions of sink j
given off by its economic growth over time.
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As time goes by, the ratio of energy changes (ln k) to land changes (ln λ), measured by ε (Eq.
(14)), indicates in each period how much emissions from economic growth can be removed by
each hectare of forestland [20]. Whereas economic growth (k) demands increasing removal of
stocks, the supply of rising stocks is constrained by biophysical limits on growing and
maintaining standing forests (λ).
Building on standard bio-economic (forestry and fishery) models, it is assumed that such a
biological growth constraint follows a logistic pattern [3]. So as to hook the economy to its
natural strings, emission flows (h^ t) must be capped (Kh) rather than the growth of removal
forest stocks (G^(X t)), which already are by nature. Capping emissions from deforestation,
though, implies that, at some former time T, when deforestation was negligible, there was a
maximum level of removal stocks, XK, associated with that least emission release (Kh).
t periods
(emission sources)
j = 1,..., 2
removal sinks* (u < v) X Z λ
u v
1 x 11 x 12 X 1 Z 1 λ1
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮
m xm1 xm2 Xm Zm λm
V V 1 V 2 V = X Z λ
M M 1 M 2 M ε
k k 1 k 2 k
(*) j = u = the smallest carbon biomass stock sink or the deforested sink; j = v = the largest carbon biomass stock sink or
the conserved sink. It is required that ε > 0, because, in biophysical terms, there cannot be a negative accountancy [10].
Therefore, so that Z > 0, j sinks must be displayed on an increasing biomass stock order. Likewise, so that M > 0, Mj = |
xmj – x1j|.
Source: [3]
Table 1. Algebraic emission-removal matrix
X t = ∑j=1
n xtj (1)
Zt =vt - ut = xtn - xt1 (2)
λt =vt / ut = xtn / xt1 (3)
( )1
1
1 / (a)
ln (/ b)
l
l
= +
=
Z V
Z V (4)
V = ∑
j=1
n V j (5)
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M = ∑
j=1
n M j = ∆X =|Xm - X1| (6)
ψt =kt / k * (7)
X = ∑
t=1
m X t (8)
Z = ∑
t=1
m Zt = ∆V =|Vn - V1| (9)
V j = ∑t=1
m xtj (10)
Dimension Variable Description Equation
Space
Xt Total removal stock at time t (1)
Zt
Exports, at time t, of removing services across the space and j
sinks (2)
λt
Bio-diversity ratio of deforested to conserved forestland at time
t (3)
λ Source-sink system’s bio-diversity ratio (4)a, (4)b
V Total spatial bio-economic value of the j removal sinks (5)
M Total spatial imports (across all sinks) (6)
ψt †Biophysical overshoot rate at time t (7)
Time
X Total removal stock over time (8)
Z Total exports over time (9)
Vj
Bio-economic value of sink j arising from its long-run supply of
biomass stocks for emission removal (10)
Mj Imports (loans) of removing services per j sink through time (11)
kj Deforestation rate at sink j (12)
k Source-sink system’s deforestation rate (13)a, (13)b, (13)c
Space-time
ε Bio-economic exchange rate (14)
ψ Long-run overshoot rate (15)
(†) kt = variable k (Eqs. (13)a-c) at time t; k* = optimal value for k.
Source: [3]
Table 2. Variables and equations of the BESF model
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M j =|xmj - x1 j| (11)
k j = xmj / x1 j (12)
( )1
1
1
1 / (a)
ln / (b)
/ (c)-
= +
=
= t t
k M X
k M X
k X X
(13)
ε = MZ =
ln k × X 1
ln λ × V 1 =
∆ X
∆ V (14)
ψ = ∏
t=1
m ψtm (15)
The parameter Kh is an algebraically found macro-scale bound to emissions. Actually, it is the
value taken on by the emission demand function h^ t  when Xt = XK. Hence, the first step to set
Kh is to find XK, which is arrived at through vector algebra (Eq. (16)). Eq. (16) fulfils a twofold
ideal requirement for sustainability:
a. Maximum economic efficiency (kj = k), so that the rates of economic growth or return even
out across the sinks [3][24];
b. Perfect ecological efficiency (ε = 1), so that neither further reallocation nor redistribution of
emissions removal takes place across the sinks [3][15][25].
Theoretically, these conditions not only allow the source-sink system to simultaneously reach
its economic and ecological sustainability, but also require it to remain sustainably stable.
Therefore, the stock level XK represents the “bio-economic cost” of achieving a stable state of
sustainability. Rather than a target to be complied with, it translates into the space-time needed
to make k stable (kj = k) and ε = 1 [3].
2( 1 k¯ -1 + λ¯ -12k¯ + λ¯
2 1
)(-u¯tv¯ t )= (00) (16)
In Eq. (16), the bar over the symbols stands for the corresponding mean values in the last row
of Table 4. However, since the distribution of forestland (λ) is known for every period and the
release of emissions from deforestation (k) instead is to be limited, k¯  must be found by taking
λ¯ = 7.975, u¯t= 24 and v¯ t  = 182.40 out of Table 4. By so doing, it turns out that k¯ ≈  7.23 and k¯ -1 ≈
0.1383. Next, by substituting these values into Eq. (17), in which, again, u¯t= 24 and X¯ t  = 206.40
come from Table 4, vK = 1319.20 and XK = 1492.78 are finally found.
Carbon Sequestration12 CO2 Sequestration and Valorization12
Time
periods (t) Years
Deforest.
rates
(103 km2)
Deforested
area
(103 km2)a
Deforest. of the
original forestb
Forest
remnant
(103 km2)c
υt
(GtC)d
ut
(GtC)e
1 1988 21.05 376.7 8.4% 4107.3 190.58 16.35
2 1989 17.77 401.4 9.0% 4082.6 189.43 17.42
3 1990 13.73 415.2 9.3% 4068.8 188.79 18.02
4 1991 11.03 426.4 9.5% 4057.6 188.27 18.51
5 1992 13.79 440.2 9.8% 4043.8 187.63 19.10
6 1993 14.90 440.2 9.8% 4043.8 187.63 19.10
7 1994 14.90 470.0 10.5% 4014.0 186.25 20.40
8 1995 29.06 497.1 11.1% 3986.9 184.99 21.57
9 1996 18.16 517.1 11.5% 3966.9 184.06 22.44
10 1997 13.23 530.1 11.8% 3953.9 183.46 23.01
11 1998 17.38 547.5 12.2% 3936.5 182.65 23.76
12 1999 17.26 564.7 12.6% 3919.2 181.85 24.51
13 2000 18.23 583.0 13.0% 3901.0 181.01 25.30
14 2001 18.17 601.1 13.4% 3882.8 180.16 26.09
15 2002 21.39 622.5 13.9% 3861.4 179.17 27.02
16 2003 25.25 647.8 14.4% 3836.2 178.00 28.11
17 2004 27.42 675.2 15.1% 3808.8 176.73 29.30
18 2005 18.85 694.0 15.5% 3789.9 175.85 30.12
19 2006 14.11 708.2 15.8% 3775.8 175.20 30.73
20 2007 11.53 719.7 16.1% 3764.3 174.66 31.23
21 2008 12.91 732.6 16.3% 3751.4 174.06 31.79
22 2009 7.46 740.1 16.5% 3743.9 173.72 32.12
23 2010 7.00 747.1 16.7% 3736.9 173.39 32.42
24 2011 6.42 753.5 16.8% 3730.5 173.09 32.70
25 2012 4.57 758.0 16.9% 3725.9 172.88 32.90
(a) According to [21], until 1997, and thereafter calculated from the previous deforested area plus the yearly deforestation
rate. (b) Figures in this column are obtained by dividing the deforested area by estimates that consider 4483.972 × 103
km2 = 4.483972 × 106 km2 as, approximately, the original forested area of Brazil’s 5 × 106 km2 Legal Amazon [22]. (c)
Figures obtained by calculating 4483.972 × 103 km2 – deforested area × 103 km2. (d) “For the region’s forests as a whole,
the mean biomass loading (t/ha) for pre-logging biomass (weighted by the area of each eco-region present) is estimated
at 464 t/ha” [22]. So the figures in this column result from 464 t/ha × forest remnant × 103 km2 = 464 t/10-2 km2 × forest
remnant × 103 km2 = (464 × forest remnant × 105) t = (464 × forest remnant × 105) 10-9 Gt. (e) The loading (biomass per
hectare) for pre-logging biomass of forests cleared in 1990 (weighted by the deforestation rate in each state) is calculated
at 434 t/ha. As before, the figures in this column result from 434 t/ha × forest remnant × 103 km2 = 434 t/10-2 km2 × forest
remnant × 103 km2 = (434 × forest remnant × 105) t = (434 × forest remnant × 105) 10-9 Gt [22].
Source: [23]
Table 3. Forest conservation and deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon (1988-2012)
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(1 k¯ -1k¯ 1 )( u¯tvK )= ( X¯ tX K ) (17)
5. Removal demand function (h^ t)
In an emissions-saving (low carbon) economy, a seesaw balance between deforestation and
conservation of carbon stocks is expected to hold. At lower deforestation rates, the savings
(conservation) of biomass stocks outstrip their consumption. But as economic growth increas‐
es, conservation savings of biomass stocks decline, while their consumption by deforestation
goes up. Thus, in order to account for these offsetting effects at any time, the observed removal
demands for deforestation and conservation are respectively determined by:
h t(ut)= u¯t - ut (18)
h t(vt)= v¯ t - vt , (19)
where u¯t  and v¯ t  are mean values for either biomass stock, displayed in the last row of Table 4.
By summing Eqs. (18) and (19), the total observed demand for removal per period is obtained:
h t = x¯ t - xt , (20)
where xt = ut + vt and x¯ t = u¯t + v¯ t .
The underlying assumption of Eqs. (18)-(20) is the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH), put
forward by the American economist Milton Friedman in the late 1950. According to this
hypothesis, consumption is smoothed in the long run, so as to handle short-run fluctuations
in income. Income fluctuates because of its transitory component, which consists of unforeseen
additions or subtractions likely to cancel out in the long run [26][27]. In an emissions avoiding
world, where carbon storage sounds like the economy’s earnings, conservation of carbon
stocks adds to income, whereas deforestation lessens it. So, Eq. (20) amounts to the permanent
component of income in the long run, which accounts for a smoother path based on consump‐
tion expectations (x¯ t) rather than on current consumption (xt). The regression5 of the results
for Eq. (20) on the observed values for Xt, in Table 5, yields the estimated long-run mean of
removal demand (Eq. (21)).
206.121 0.999
t- stat. 497.034 496.808
sig. t . 0.0000
ˆ
0.0000
t th X= -
- (21)
5 All statistical estimations were performed in SPSS Statistics 17.0.
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(t) (ut) (vt) (Xt) Eq. (18) Eq. (19) Eq. (20)
(Zt)
Eq. (2)
(M)
Eq. (6)
Eq.
(14)
(k)
Eq.(13c)
(λt)
Eq. (3)
1 1988 16.35 190.58 206.93 7.65 -8.18 -0.53 174.23 — — 1.00036 11.657
2 1989 17.42 189.43 206.85 6.57 -7.03 -0.45 172.01 2.2181 12.9 1.00020 10.874
3 1990 18.02 188.79 206.81 5.98 -6.39 -0.41 170.77 1.2392 7.3 1.00016 10.477
4 1991 18.51 188.27 206.78 5.49 -5.87 -0.38 169.77 1.0058 5.9 1.00020 10.174
5 1992 19.10 187.63 206.74 4.89 -5.23 -0.34 168.53 1.2392 7.4 1.00000 9.821
6 1993 19.10 187.63 206.74 4.89 -5.23 -0.34 168.53 0.0000 0.0 1.00043 9.821
7 1994 20.40 186.25 206.65 3.60 -3.85 -0.25 165.85 2.6760 16.1 1.00039 9.131
8 1995 21.57 184.99 206.57 2.42 -2.59 -0.17 163.42 2.4336 14.9 1.00029 8.575
9 1996 22.44 184.06 206.51 1.55 -1.66 -0.11 161.62 1.7960 11.1 1.00019 8.202
10 1997 23.01 183.46 206.47 0.99 -1.06 -0.07 160.45 1.1674 7.3 1.00025 7.974
11 1998 23.76 182.65 206.41 0.23 -0.25 -0.02 158.89 1.5610 9.8 1.00025 7.687
12 1999 24.51 181.85 206.36 -0.51 0.55 0.04 157.34 1.5499 9.9 1.00027 7.420
13 2000 25.30 181.01 206.31 -1.31 1.40 0.09 155.71 1.6367 10.5 1.00026 7.154
14 2001 26.09 180.16 206.25 -2.09 2.24 0.14 154.07 1.6312 10.6 1.00031 6.906
15 2002 27.02 179.17 206.19 -3.02 3.23 0.21 152.15 1.9212 12.6 1.00037 6.632
16 2003 28.11 178.00 206.11 -4.12 4.40 0.28 149.89 2.2672 15.1 1.00040 6.331
17 2004 29.30 176.73 206.03 -5.31 5.68 0.37 147.42 2.4626 16.7 1.00027 6.031
18 2005 30.12 175.85 205.97 -6.13 6.55 0.42 145.73 1.6924 11.6 1.00021 5.838
19 2006 30.73 175.20 205.93 -6.74 7.20 0.47 144.46 1.2670 8.8 1.00017 5.700
20 2007 31.23 174.66 205.90 -7.24 7.74 0.50 143.43 1.0356 7.2 1.00019 5.592
21 2008 31.79 174.06 205.86 -7.80 8.34 0.54 142.27 1.1594 8.1 1.00011 5.475
22 2009 32.12 173.72 205.84 -8.12 8.68 0.56 141.60 0.6703 4.7 1.00010 5.409
23 2010 32.42 173.39 205.82 -8.43 9.01 0.58 140.97 0.6286 4.5 1.00009 5.348
24 2011 32.70 173.09 205.80 -8.71 9.31 0.60 140.39 0.5763 4.1 1.00007 5.293
25 2012 32.90 172.88 205.78 -8.90 9.52 0.62 139.98 0.4105 2.9 — 5.255
Mean 24.00 182.40 206.40 1.00023 7.975
Table 4. Observed deforested, conserved and demanded biomass in the Brazilian Legal Amazon (1988-2012)
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Time
periods Years
Xt
(GtC)
h t
(GtC)
h^ t
(GtC)
g(v(Xt))
(GtC)
F^ (X t)
(GtC)
G(Xt)
(GtC)
G^(X t)
(GtC)
(t) Eq.(20) Eq.(21) Eq.(23) Eq.(25) Eq.(26) Eq.(27)
T ? 1492.78 — -1285.17 0.0000 0.00 -1492.78 1.25×107
1 1988 206.93 -0.53 -0.5983 0.5370 1431.25 1224.33 1215.00
2 1989 206.85 -0.45 -0.5242 0.5376 1252.76 1045.91 1039.41
3 1990 206.81 -0.41 -0.4829 0.5379 1153.21 946.40 941.33
4 1991 206.78 -0.38 -0.4493 0.5382 1072.51 865.73 861.74
5 1992 206.74 -0.34 -0.4080 0.5386 973.18 766.45 763.70
6 1993 206.74 -0.34 -0.4080 0.5386 973.18 766.45 763.70
7 1994 206.65 -0.25 -0.3187 0.5393 759.12 552.47 552.05
8 1995 206.57 -0.17 -0.2374 0.5400 564.94 358.38 359.66
9 1996 206.51 -0.11 -0.1775 0.5405 421.94 215.44 217.72
10 1997 206.47 -0.07 -0.1385 0.5409 329.13 122.67 125.48
11 1998 206.4139 -0.02 -0.0864 0.5413 205.20 -1.22 2.17
12 1999 206.36 0.04 -0.0347 0.5418 82.34 -124.02 -120.23
13 2000 206.31 0.09 0.0199 0.5422 -47.19 -253.50 -249.45
14 2001 206.25 0.14 0.0744 0.5427 -176.08 -382.33 -378.21
15 2002 206.19 0.21 0.1385 0.5433 -327.61 -533.80 -529.81
16 2003 206.11 0.28 0.2141 0.5439 -506.05 -712.16 -708.66
17 2004 206.03 0.37 0.2963 0.5446 -699.41 -905.44 -902.84
18 2005 205.97 0.42 0.3528 0.5451 -832.02 -1037.99 -1036.24
19 2006 205.93 0.47 0.3951 0.5455 -931.14 -1137.07 -1136.09
20 2007 205.90 0.50 0.4296 0.5458 -1012.07 -1217.97 -1217.69
21 2008 205.86 0.54 0.4683 0.5461 -1102.58 -1308.43 -1309.03
22 2009 205.84 0.56 0.4907 0.5463 -1154.85 -1360.68 -1361.82
23 2010 205.82 0.58 0.5117 0.5465 -1203.84 -1409.66 -1411.33
24 2011 205.80 0.60 0.5309 0.5466 -1248.73 -1454.53 -1456.72
25 2012 205.78 0.62 0.5446 0.5468 -1280.69 -1486.47 -1489.04
Table 5. Observed forest data and estimated demand (h^ t) and supply (G^(X t)) functions of the BESF model
6. Removal supply function (G^(X t))
By substituting, in Eq. (21), XK = 1492.78, found by Eqs. (16) and (17), for Xt, the least level of
emissions demand Kh = -1286.16 comes out. This value is used as the lower limit of a logistic
function (Eq. (23)) in the following constrained optimisation problem:
Carbon Sequestration16 CO2 Sequestration and Valorization16
Objective function:
min
X t
∑
t
St =minX t ∑t g(v(X t)) - h^ t (22)
Constraints:
Constraint I:
h^ t =206.121 - 0.999X t (21)
Constraint II:
g(v(X t)) = 1(1 / Kh ) + b0b1X t
g(v(X t))= 1(1 / -1286.16) + 0.07075414 × 1.01593216 X t (23)
Constraint III:
g(v(X t))≥ h^ t , (24)
where St stands for the instantaneous surplus arising from the gap between removal growth
rates (g(v(Xt))) and removal consumption rates (h^ t). Because of Eq. (24), St ≥ 0, that is, at any
time, the rate at which removal stocks are supplied must be greater than or equal to the rate
at which they are demanded. In Eq. (23), the parameter Kh is found by Eqs. (16), (17) and (21),
whereas the parameters b0 and b1 are provided by GAMS-IDE (General Algebraic Modelling
System – Integrated Development Environment), version 24.1.2 (http://www.gams.com/
download/), in which the optimisation programme described by Eqs. (21)-(24) was run.
The optimal values for g(v(Xt)) are displayed in Table 5. They are now employed to estimate
the future supply of removal stocks (F^ (X t)) given the existing ones (Xt), used up in the present.
The estimated variable F^ (X t) stands for an outflow-inflow ratio, defined by logistically con‐
strained rates of demand (numerator) and supply (denominator) of removal stocks (Eq. (25)).
The difference between F^ (X t) and Xt is the removal supply per time period (G(Xt)). Starting
from the values for G(Xt), found by Eq. (26) and displayed in Table 5, it is possible to estimate
the removal supply function (Eq. (27)), whose values are also displayed in Table 5.
F^ (X t)= ∂ h^ t / ∂ X tg (v(X t )) =
h^ t (Kh - h^ t )
g (v(X t )) (25)
G(X t)= F^ (X t) - X t (26)
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( ) 2ˆ 5.727 244006.276
t- stat. 588.143 588.763
sig. t . 0.0000 0.0000
t tG X X= -
- (27)
7. Avoiding deforestation versus stock maintenance approach
All removal market functions are drawn in Figure 3. They look like those in Figure 2.c, and
their interplay shows how long emissions from deforestation can be removed by natural forest
stocks. In deforestation-conservation settings, the cost of maintaining a high economic growth
rate (ln k) would be an abrupt fall in the rate at which natural removal stocks grow (ln λ). As
demonstrated by Eq. (3), in Table 2, and by the figures in the last column of Table 4, the value
of λ indirectly defines the quantities of removal consumption (ht) from deforestation (ut) or
removal savings from conservation (vt). Thus, h^ t  (Eq. (21)) hinges on that sink distribution,
and so does G^(X t) (Eq. (27)), whose estimation ultimately relies on Kh — the lower bound of
removal demand. As a matter of fact, λ is the critical variable drawing the bottom line in carbon
removal markets.
The impacts of λ on the equilibrium of removal markets are shown in Table 6. The equilibrium
scenarios checked, but the BESF one, follow the standard fishery analysis [28]. In the context
of deforestation and forest conservation, though, there are important remarks regarding
equilibrium conditions. To begin with, although the MSY equilibrium might apply to unnatu‐
ral, even-aged stands, it is not likely to suit the dynamics of conservation of natural forests and
deforestation. It is known that in natural forests, the wide frequency and age range of tree
species points to a biomass yielding function that does not reach a maximum sustainable yield.
Mathematically, this is translated by taking the first derivative of Eq. (27) and making it equal
to zero. Thus, it is found that XMSY = 21303.15 GtC, which is a prohibitively high level of removal
stocks, provided their logistic upper bound is XK = 1492.78. The same holds for the restricted
access (RA) stock level, which is found to be slightly lower (XRA = 21303.06 GtC).
Although in standard bio-economic (fishery) analysis, the latter is expected to be higher than
the former, it must be borne in mind that, in a compensation approach — such as avoiding
deforestation —, the demand for removal stocks grows with deforestation (Figure 4.a). There‐
fore, conservation requires XMSY > XRA, since a smaller compensating stock means that less
deforestation occurred.
On the other hand, Figure 3 shows that the greater the stock, the smaller its demand is, because
the stock can only grow when its depletion is low. Thus, as is clear so far, Figure 3 illustrates
a rather different standpoint, namely, a stock maintenance approach (Figure 4.b). It has been
argued that such a conservation approach favours the largest forest countries, like Brazil. Unlike
in small forest countries, with only tiny remnants of forest left, in countries where large
expanses of forest remain standing, stock maintenance represents a much greater carbon
service than does avoiding deforestation [21].
Carbon Sequestration18 CO2 Sequestration and Valorization18
In this regard, the equilibrium conditions in Table 6 had to be adjusted to fall within a stock
maintenance rationale. Since, in Figure 3, the slopes of the functions G^(X t) (Eq. (27)) and h^ t
(Eq. (21)) are never expected to be equal — as the columns labelled “rate of return” and “rate
of depletion” in Table 6 also show —within the feasible region (X0A ≤ Xt* ≤ XK), RA equilibrium
only calls for maximising some positive level of Yt, which could otherwise be warranted if the
functions G^(X t) and h^ t  were to have the same slopes somewhere. However, as the outcomes
in Table 6 show, a positive Yt can be accomplished with a negative value for G^(X t), provided
that, in absolute terms, this is smaller than that for h^ t . Since G^(X t) < 0 is environmentally
threatening, BESF equilibrium becomes a more stringent condition, because it calls both for
positive Yt and G^(X t). By minimising this positive level of Yt, then, the BESF equilibrium
ensures that, for a removal demand function like ht, in Figure 4.b, and h^ t , in Figure 3, the stock
level satisfying this will lie slightly beyond (greater than) K — the stock level at which G^(X t)
= 0 — and further beyond (greater than) XOA — where G^(X t) becomes equal to h^ t , but turns
out to be negative.
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Figure 3. Removal market functions
The open access stock level (XOA) is the smallest, yet just slightly smaller than the others. As
expected from standard theory on renewable resources, the economic rent at this level is zero.
At any other equilibrium point, it is non-zero and positive. But it is the highest at BESF, which
minimises the throughput of maintaining stocks by requiring the supply of their emissions
removal services (G^(X t)) always to be positive.
Finally, by comparing the optimal stock levels (Xt*), in Table 6, with the observed ones (Xt), in
Table 5, it can be inferred when each equilibrium scenario must have occurred. It is worrying
to ascertain that all of them are already gone somewhere between 1998 and 1999.
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Figure 4. The BESF model functions and the REDD approaches 
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Equilibriaa Equilibriumconditionsb
Optimalc stock
(Xt *)
Removal supply
(G^(X t*))
Removal
demand (h t*)
Rate of
returnd
( d G^(X t*)d X t* )
Rate of
depletione
( d h^ t*d X t* )
Economic rent
(Y t =
G^(X t*) - h^ t*)Eq. (27) Eq. (21)(in GtC) (in GtC) (in GtC)
BESF
min Yt > 0
G^(X t) > 0
X OA ≤ Xt *≤ XK
206.412933 → 0.000 -0.086 2.364 0.999 > 0.086
K G^(X t) = 0 206.412933 0.000 -0.086 2.364 0.999 0.086
MSY
d G^(X t )
d X t = 0
X OA ≤ Xt *≤ XK
— — — — — —
RA max Yt > 0X OA ≤ Xt *≤ XK
206.412933 -3.49×10-10 -0.086 2.364 0.999 < 0.086
OA G^(X t) = h^ t 206.412898 -0.08 -0.08 2.364 0.999 0.000
(a) BESF = Bio-Economic carbon Sequestration by Forests; K = steady-state equilibrium; MSY = Maximum Sustainable
Yield; RA = Restricted Access equilibrium; OA = Open Access equilibrium. (b) In standard fishery models, however, XRA
is found where dG^(X t) / d X t = dh^ t / d X t . (c) Provided by GAMS-IDE 24.1.2. (d) First derivative of Eq. (27) = 11.454Xt.
However, so that G^(X t) and h^ t  can be plotted together, the barter ratio between them is 10 GtC of G^(X t) per 10 MtC
of h^ t , as the vertical axis of the graph in Figure 3 indicates. More simply, this barter ratio can be expressed as 1 GtC : 1
MtC, which means 103 MtC : 1 MtC. Therefore, so that rates of return and depletion can be compared with one anoth‐
er, the former must be multiplied by 10-3. (e) First derivative of Eq. (21).
Table 6. Removal market equilibrium analysis
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8. Aggregate emissions demand or removal supply function (λ^(ε^))
Perhaps these worries could have been dismissed before, if the variable regulating land-use
changes (λ) had not been overlooked. As seen, ε (Eq. (14)) — the bio-economic exchange rate
— is defined as the ratio of ecological debt — excess demand for removal services (supply of
emissions) — to ecological credit — excess supply of removal services (demand for emissions).
Although it is an underlying variable, it stands for the shadow price measuring, along an optimal
path through time, the marginal bio-economic value of the forestland asset [19]. When the
speed k of economic activity drives deforestation, forestland shrinks and thus ε is expected to
rise (depreciate).
Since ε critically and ultimately depends on λ and k, it must, to begin with, be expressed in
terms of them. Methodologically, this can be first accomplished by fixing k = k¯ =1.00023, given
in the last row of Table 4. Then this rate is assumed to hold for every year according to the
following rule:
X t -1 / X t' = k¯ =1.00023, (28)
where Xt’ is the stock level that would be observed in column Xt of Table 5, if k = k¯= 1.0023.
As λ changes, so will ε — whose calculation follows Eqs. (11) and (6), for M (imports); (2) and
(9), for Z (exports); and (14), for ε proper. These outcomes must be ordered pair-wise, according
to increasing values of λ. The objective of this disposition is to check how ε is affected by
changes in λ. Next, an equation for ε, as a long-run function (thus, bearing no t index) of λ, is
estimated:
( ) 1.096ˆ exp 0.131 lnln
t- stat. 243.522 1048.581
sig. t . 0.0000 0.0000
e l l
æ ö= - +ç ÷è ø
- (29)
Finally, the results for ε^(λ), in Eq. (29), are used as inputs (independent variables) to arrive at
an equation for λ as a long-run function of ε:
( ) 2.766ˆln exp 1.127
t- stat. 133.522 214.563
sig. t . 0.0000 0.000
ˆ ˆ
0
l e e
æ ö= - +ç ÷è ø
- (30)
Eq. (30) stands for the aggregate emissions demand or removal supply function in the long run.
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9. Aggregate emissions supply or removal demand function (k^ (ε^))
By a similar procedure, the functional relationship between ε and k, as well as between k and
ε, can then be calculated. This time, though, the variable made fixed is λ = λ¯= 7.975, given in
the last row of Table 4. This value is kept unchanged for each two consecutive years, to either
of which Eqs. (1) and (3) apply:
xt , j + xt , j+1 = X t (1)a
xt , j+1 / xt , j = λ¯ =7.975 (3)a
By substituting Eq. (3)a into Eq. (1)a, it turns out that:
X t =(1 + λ¯)xt , j, (1)b
which can be correspondingly replaced in Eq. (13)c to find the new value of k, at each two
consecutive periods, when λ = λ¯ = 7.975 and thence remains constant. Again, the resulting ε
requires Eqs. (11), (6), (2), (9) and (14). Also, like before, so as to inquire into the effects of
changing k on ε, these variables are taken pair-wise on an increasing order of k values. Lastly,
an equation for ε, as a long-run function (thus, bearing no t index) of k, can be estimated:
( )ˆ 6434.098lnln
t- stat. 3921.720
sig. t . 0.0000
k ke =
(31)
Now, the outcomes for ε^(k ), in Eq. (31), are used as inputs (independent variables) to obtain
an equation for k as a long-run function of ε:
( ) 4ˆ 0.99999998 1.554575 10
t- stat. — —
ˆ ˆ
sig. t. — —
k e e-= + ´
(32)
Eq. (32) stands for the aggregate emissions supply or removal demand function in the long run.
10. Macro-bio-economic scenarios
Based on Eqs. (30) and (32), REDD, CDM and BAU scenarios are tested to understand how
well conservation (REDD) and compensation (CDM) strategies can do as compared with
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business-as-usual (BAU) ones (Table 7 and Table 8). The most useful results shown by Table
8 are those displayed in its last two columns. They make clear how much the natural forest
and the economy are expected to grow annually, through 25 years, in each scenario.
It is noteworthy that a stringent conservation scenario, such as REDD1, requires an optimal
value for λ (λ^REDD1* = 5.787) that is not too far from its observed mean value, displayed in the
last row and column of Table 4 (λ¯= 7.975). Thus, the allowed annual deforestation rate through
25 years (Eq. (33)) is 3.18% p.a. (last column of Table 8). This figure might sound startling when
compared, for instance, with the deforestation rate in the Brazilian Legal Amazon for a single
year: just between August 2012 and August 2013, this rate reached 20% [31]! However, neither
would more “economic growth-driven” strategies (CDM and BAU’s) stand such a high annual
deforestation rate. Nearly all of them (last four rows and last column of Table 8) would allow
for a yearly deforestation rate of about 7.8%. On the other hand, a 100% rate of deforestation
reduction, even spread over 25 years (scenario REDD2), would render no more than an
economic growth rate as low as 0.00149% (last column of Table 8). These numbers help shed
some light on the feasibility of the targets set by deforestation reduction programmes [29]
(Figure 7). Figure 5 shows that the supply of emissions (k^) is nearly perfectly inelastic to the
shadow price ε, whereas the removal of them (λ^) dramatically falls with the rise of ε. Although
at some high value of ε, the demand for removal also becomes almost inelastic to price changes,
this only happens at very low levels of existing removal stocks, when thus λ^→ 1 (Eq. (3)) and
the share of forest conservation approaches that of deforestation (v → u) or becomes even
smaller (v < u).
    
λ ߣመREDD1∗̅ߣ
෠݇ ε ߣመ
ε ε ߣመ →
→
Scenario Constraints Objective-function (W or W’)a 
REDD1 ln ߣ෢ ൐ ln ෠݇; ln ߣ෢  = 1.755682b maxܹ ൌ ln ߣ෢ െ ෠݇
REDD2 ln ߣ෢ ൐ ln ෠݇; ln ߣ෢  = 1.028114c maxܹ ൌ ln ߣ෢ െ ෠݇
CDM ln ߣ෢ ൌ ln ෠݇ max/minܹ ൌ ln ߣ෢ െ ෠݇ or ܹᇱ ൌ ෠݇ െ ln ߣ෢  
BAU1 ln ߣ෢ ൏ ln ෠݇; ෠݇ = 1.8092514d maxܹᇱ ൌ ෠݇ െ ln ߣ෢
BAU2 ln ߣ෢ ൏ ln ෠݇; ෠݇ = 2.6658363e maxܹᇱ ൌ ෠݇ െ ln ߣ෢
BAU3 ln ߣ෢ ൏ ln ෠݇; ෠݇ = 3.3863549f maxܹᇱ ൌ ෠݇ െ ln ߣ෢
λ
λ
ቆ √7.4648438మఱళ ቇ λ√2మఱ
ࢿො∗	 ࣅ෠∗	 ࢒࢔ ࣅ෢ ∗ ࢑෡∗ ࢒࢔ ࢑෡∗ ࣅ෠∗ ࢑෡∗ ࢾ∗
ln ߣ෢ ൌ ෠݇
(a) Because, as shown by Table 4, k is much smaller than λ, the greater of them must be scaled down through logarithms
to make them comparable. (b) Growth rate for λ that would smooth, over 25 years (1988-2012), the accumulated
deforestation reduction rate defined by a 7-year programme, from 2007 to 2015, for reducing deforestation in the
Brazilian Amazon [29]. The annual reduction rates for every period t = 1,..., 7 are, respectively, 25%, 25%, 30%, 40%,
50%, 75% and 100%. The “capitalisation” (multiplication) of all these rates yields 7.4648438, which amounts to the full
figure to be reached in 7 years. This 7-year time is factored into a 25-year period, thereby yielding 3.5714286 sub-periods,
over which the deforestation reduction rate accumulated during 7 years is spread according to its geometric mean( 7.4648438257 ). (c) Growth rate for λ that would amount to a 100% deforestation reduction in 25 years. It is calculated
by 225 , where 2 is a rate of growth that is worth 100%. (d) Value needed to yield an annual rate of economic growth of
2.40% during 25 years. This rate is the one projected for Brazil’s GDP growth in 2013 by the Brazilian Central Bank, in its
latest Focus Report [30]. (e) Value needed to yield an annual rate of economic growth of 4.00% during 25 years. (f) Value
needed to yield an annual economic growth rate of 5.00% during 25 years.
Table 7. Scenario analysis
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Scenario ε^
*
(× 10-4) λ^
* ln λ^ * k^ * ln k^ * λ^
*%
p.a. †
k^ *%
p.a.†
Allowed def.
rate δ *% p.a.
(Eq.(33))
REDD1 1.637 5.7874 1.755682 1.000254 0.000254 7.27520 0.00102 3.1804
REDD2 2.395 2.7958 1.028114 1.000372 0.000372 4.19819 0.00149 6.7997
ln λ^ = k^ 2.453 2.7193 1.000381 1.000381 0.000381 4.08267 0.00153 6.8623
CDM 2464.70 1.3832 0.324368 1.383156 0.324368 1.30592 1.30592 7.8350
BAU1 5205.61 1.3829 0.324176 1.809251 0.592913 1.30515 2.40000 7.8352
BAU2 10715.70 1.3828 0.324087 2.665836 0.980518 1.30479 4.00000 7.8353
BAU3 15350.53 1.3827 0.324062 3.386355 1.219754 1.30469 5.00000 7.8353
(†) Growth rates per annum (p.a.). Figures under these column captions respectively come from ( λ^*25 ) - 1 × 100 and
( k^ *25 ) - 1 × 100. (‡) Provided by GAMS-IDE 24.1.2.
Table 8. Optimal (*) results‡ from scenario analysis
δ * = (λ¯ - λ^*)25 - 1 ×100,  with λ¯ > λ^* (33)
ߝ̂∗ ߣመ∗ ln ߣ෢ ∗ ෠݇∗ ln ෠݇∗ ߣመ∗ ෠݇∗ ߜ∗
ln ߣ෢ ൌ ෠݇
ቂቀ ඥߣመ∗భ మఱ⁄ ቁ െ 1ቃ ൈ100 ቂቀ ඥ෠݇∗భ మఱ⁄ ቁ െ 1ቃ ൈ 100
ߜ∗ ൌ ቈ ට൫̅ߣ െ ߣመ∗൯భ మఱ⁄ െ 1቉ ൈ 100, 	 ̅ߣ ൐ ߣመ∗
෠݇
ε ߣመ
ε εߣመ → →
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Figure 5. Aggregate equilibrium for conservation and deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon
11. Removal trade
Now, the optimal values for ε brought to light in Table 8 can be used in Table 9 to define, as
in Figure 2.b, the amount of removal loans across the space (Z) and over time (M). Of course,
this previously requires that both Z and M are estimated as long-run functions of ε. However,
as shown in Table 4, it is precisely ε that arises from observable Z and M; not the other way
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around. So, what must be estimated first and foremost is an equation in which ε works as a
long-run function of observable Z and M.
( ) ( )ˆ exp 1.428
t- stat. 26.544
sig. t . 0.0000
Z Ze = ´
(34)
( ) 0.926ˆ 6.643
t- stat. 67.364 35.514
sig. t . 0.0000 0.0000
M Me =
(35)
Then, the outcomes for ε^(Z ) and ε^(M ), in Eqs. (34) and (35), are used as inputs (independent
variables) to obtain the equations for Z and M as long-run functions of ε:
( ) 4.154ˆ exp 0.895
t- stat. 259.616 133.481
sig. t
ˆ ˆ
. 0.0000 0.0000
Z e e
æ ö= -ç ÷è ø
- (36)
( ) 1.08ˆ ˆ0.129
t- stat. — —
sig. t. — —
ˆM e e=
(37)
Scenario ε^(× 10-4)
ln Z^
(× 102) ln M^
β=
ln Z^ - ln M^
Z^ (GtC)
Eq.(36)a
M^ (GtC)
Eq.(37)
B=
Z^ - M^
Min B 0.940 -3.523403 -2.114586 -1.408817 0.0295 0.1207 -0.0912
REDD1 1.637 -1.642841 -1.515764 -0.127077 0.1934 0.2196 -0.0262
B = 0 1.799 -1.413446 -1.413446 0.000000 0.2433 0.2433 0.0000
REDD2 2.395 -0.839176 -1.104520 0.265344 0.4321 0.3314 0.1007
ln λ^ = k^ 2.453 -0.798110 -1.078638 0.280528 0.4502 0.3401 0.1101
Max B 5.454 0.133360 -0.215882 0.349242 1.1427 0.8058 0.3368
B = 0 10.621 0.503872 0.503872 0.000000 1.6551 1.6551 0.0000
CDM 2464.70 0.893315 6.386668 -5.493353 2.4432 593.87 -591.43
BAU1 5205.61 0.894202 7.194149 -6.299947 2.4454 1331.62 -1329.17
BAU2 10715.70 0.894612 7.973880 -7.079267 2.4464 2904.10 -2901.66
BAU3 15350.53 0.894729 8.362075 -7.467345 2.4467 4281.57 -4279.12
(a) Actually, these figures are in hundreds of GtC, so that, as indicated by Table 4, their order of magnitude can be compared to
that of M^ . (b) Results provided by GAMS-IDE 24.1.2.
Table 9. Scenario analysisb for conservation and compensation loans
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Figure 6. Optimal path† for conservation (Z^ ) — REDD — and compensation (M^ ) — CDM — loans (a) and rates (b) in
the long run
Eqs. (36) and (37) define, respectively, the optimal path of conservation (REDD) and compensa‐
tion (CDM) to be loaned out in the long run (Figure 6.a). Since conservation is the surplus of
carbon removal services, they can be exported (lent) to somewhere else. On the other hand,
when these missing services have nevertheless been already used, some compensation is due.
However, compensating for environmental services that were already lacking before implies
importing (borrowing) them from somewhere. In this sense, conservation (exports) defines an
excess supply of removal services, while compensation (imports) is caused by an excess demand
for removal services. If these services are to be loaned out, the sink yielding conservation lends
them, whereas the sink owing compensation borrows them.
In any event, the demand for these loans, as shown in Figure 2, lies behind disaggregate (Figure
3) — periodical — and aggregate (Figure 5) — long run — removal needs. As long as B (last
column of Table 9) stands for the balance of carbon trading loans, it is interesting to note that
a stringent scenario, such as REDD1 (Table 7), yields more ecological debt (M^ ) than ecological
credit (Z^ ). This balance only turns out to be positive in the interval where 1.799 ≤ ε^ ≤ 10.621. B
reaches its maximum in this interval, when ε^ = 5.454. Later, it starts dropping, reaching zero
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again. From then on, it becomes increasingly negative, and neither the CDM nor BAU scenario
can turn it over anymore.
Actually, CDM and BAU1 are but very loose scenarios. When they come into play, the
ecological credit region (1.799 ≤ε^≤ 10.621) has already been left behind. Therefore, in spite of
the high values for ε^  set by CDM and BAU scenarios, these prices appear to be too low to
prevent B < 0. Although CDM requires that ln λ = ln k  (Table 7 and Table 8), existing ecological
conditions demand, rather, that ln λ > ln k .
If these conditions are overlooked, no further rise in ε^, as in the BAUs scenarios, can prevent B
from keep falling. That likely occurs because the environmental capacity of providing remov‐
al services has been already overshot. As it turns out, ε^  cannot be set like usual prices can;
instead, it is set by ecological conditions, as though ecology were guiding the economy [32].
12. Target setting
Table 10 focuses on scenario REDD1, from Table 8, in order to demonstrate how an economy
can be ecologically guided. Of course, the figures in Table 10 do not account for the real picture.
Rather, they relate to a 25-year deforestation period (1988-2012), to show how things would
look if it had followed out the optimal path suggested by the conservation scenario REDD1.
The percentages in the last column of Table 10 were merged in such a way that the 25-year
period is divided into 7 time lags. By so doing, REDD1 reduction path, although applying to
a different time period (1988-2012), can be compared to the same time length of the defores‐
tation reduction programme tailored by [29]. The comparison is shown in Figure 7.
Nevertheless, it can still be asked why the percentage deforestation rate along the optimal path
in Table 10 (15.59%) does not match that in the last column of Table 8 (3.1804%). Even though
the former is referred to in deforested area terms, in km2, while the latter, in carbon biomass,
in GtC, the proper calculation (Eq. (39)) shows that the values would be equal. Accordingly,
the percentage deforestation rates displayed in Table 10 can be reckoned either in carbon
biomass (GtC) or in area units (km2). Actually, the underlying reason for the mismatch between
deforestation rates in Table 10 and in Table 8 is that the rates in the former are bounded (Eq.
(33)), whereas those in the latter are unbounded. This difference can be grasped from combining
Eqs. (1) and (3) to yield:
X t =ut + λtut = (1 + λt)ut (38)
From Eq. (38) and from the definition of the deforestation rate (δt) given in note i of Table 10,
it turns out that:
δt =
ut
X t =
ut(1 + λt )ut =
1
1 + λt (39)
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If λt, in Eq. (39), takes on whatever optimal value displayed in Table 8, then this equation can
be compared with Eq. (33). Yet now, unlike in the former equation, in the latter λ^* has an upper
bound (λ¯= 7.975). Since this ceiling stands for a mean value for the whole period (1988-2012),
it is not surprising that δ* in Eq. (33) is lower than that arising from Eq. (39) — displayed in the
antepenult column of Table 10.
The deforested area in Table 10 is given by Eq. (39). Its size follows closely — yet throughout
a 25-year period — the size of forestland that, according to Table 3, has been cut down since
2005 (t = 18). However, while in the observed data of Table 3, the size of deforested land keeps
on getting bigger, in the optimal path of Table 10, it increasingly shrinks.
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1 1988 30.49 176.44 206.93 145.95 0.023890 1.637 702.46 3802.57 4505.03 16806.21 15.59 — 4.01
2 1989 30.48 176.38 206.85 145.90 0.023881 1.637 702.21 3801.21 4503.42 16104.00 15.59 251.55 4.18
3 1990 30.47 176.34 206.81 145.87 0.023877 1.637 702.07 3800.45 4502.52 15401.93 15.59 140.54 4.36
4 1991 30.46 176.31 206.78 145.85 0.023873 1.637 701.96 3799.83 4501.79 14699.98 15.59 114.06 4.56
5 1992 30.46 176.28 206.74 145.82 0.023868 1.637 701.82 3799.07 4500.89 13998.16 15.59 140.54 4.77
6 1993 30.46 176.28 206.74 145.82 0.023868 1.637 701.82 3799.07 4500.89 13296.35 15.59 0.00 5.01
7 1994 30.45 176.20 206.65 145.76 0.023858 1.637 701.51 3797.43 4498.94 12594.83 15.59 303.49 5.28
8 1995 30.43 176.13 206.57 145.70 0.023848 1.637 701.24 3795.93 4497.17 11893.60 15.59 275.99 5.57
9 1996 30.42 176.08 206.51 145.66 0.023841 1.637 701.03 3794.83 4495.86 11192.57 15.59 203.68 5.89
10 1997 30.42 176.05 206.47 145.63 0.023837 1.637 700.90 3794.12 4495.02 10491.67 15.59 132.40 6.26
11 1998 30.41 176.00 206.41 145.59 0.023831 1.637 700.72 3793.16 4493.88 9790.94 15.59 177.03 6.68
12 1999 30.40 175.96 206.36 145.55 0.023825 1.637 700.55 3792.21 4492.75 9090.40 15.59 175.77 7.16
13 2000 30.40 175.91 206.31 145.52 0.023818 1.637 700.36 3791.20 4491.56 8390.04 15.59 185.62 7.70
14 2001 30.39 175.87 206.25 145.48 0.023812 1.637 700.18 3790.20 4490.38 7689.86 15.59 185.00 8.35
15 2002 30.38 175.81 206.19 145.43 0.023805 1.637 699.96 3789.02 4488.98 6989.90 15.59 217.88 9.10
16 2003 30.37 175.75 206.11 145.38 0.023796 1.637 699.70 3787.63 4487.33 6290.20 15.59 257.12 10.01
17 2004 30.35 175.68 206.03 145.32 0.023786 1.637 699.42 3786.12 4485.54 5590.78 15.59 279.28 11.12
18 2005 30.35 175.63 205.97 145.28 0.023780 1.637 699.23 3785.08 4484.31 4891.55 15.59 191.93 12.51
19 2006 30.34 175.59 205.93 145.25 0.023775 1.637 699.09 3784.30 4483.39 4192.46 15.59 143.69 14.29
20 2007 30.34 175.56 205.90 145.23 0.023771 1.637 698.97 3783.66 4482.63 3493.49 15.59 117.44 16.67
21 2008 30.33 175.53 205.86 145.20 0.023767 1.637 698.84 3782.95 4481.79 2794.65 15.59 131.49 20.00
22 2009 30.33 175.51 205.84 145.18 0.023764 1.637 698.76 3782.54 4481.30 2095.89 15.59 76.02 25.00
23 2010 30.32 175.49 205.82 145.17 0.023762 1.637 698.69 3782.15 4480.84 1397.20 15.59 71.29 33.34
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25 2012 30.32 175.46 205.78 145.15 0.023758 1.637 698.58 3781.55 4480.13 0.00 15.59 46.55 100.00
Total 17508.67 94778.08
(a) ut = Xt ÷ (1 +λ^*). (b) vt = Xt – ut. (c) Eq. (2). (d) Eq. (14): Mt = ε × Zt. (e) (ut ÷ 434) × 10-4, according to note e in Table 3. (f) (vt ÷ 464) × 10-4,
according to note d in Table 3. (g) Xt (in km2) = ut (in km2) + vt (in km2). However unrealistic it may sound, the total area “shrinks” to ac‐
count for the loss of forestland implied by substituting the carbon stored in deforested sites for that stored in natural forests. (h) For t = 1
(1988), Σtut (in km2) = 17508.67 – u1 (in km2); for t > 1, (remaining deforestation)t – 1 – ut (in km2). (i) ut (in km2) ÷ Xt (in km2). (j) (ut – 1 – ut) (in
km2) × 103. (k) For t = 1 (1988), ut (in km2) ÷ Σtut (in km2); for t > 1, ut (in km2) ÷ (remaining deforestation)t – 1.
Table 10. Deforestation targets and rates from optimal results in the REDD1 scenario (λ^* = 5.7874) (Table 8)
(*) During 1988-2012. (**) From 2007 to 2015 [29].
Figure 7. Targets for reducing deforestation in the Brazilian Legal Amazon
13. Conclusion
The analysis carried out so far has demonstrated that, where policy climate and deforestation
are concerned, carbon conservation (REDD) and compensation (CDM) entail a trade-off that
cannot be overcome by monetary mechanisms. Instead of money, the underlying variable
which forest value rests upon is the bio-diversity ratio (λ). Although it is typically a space-
based measure, this ratio also accounts for forestland distribution over time. When λ is affected
by the demand of removal stocks (h) set off by the emissions growth from the economy, the
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amount of compensation (M) for these emissions over time is assumed to feed on the conser‐
vation (Z) of carbon savings carried out at each period.
Conservation surplus can be loaned out to afford compensation demands from an economy
producing growing emissions. However, such demands must be halted somewhere, otherwise
the supply of removal forest stocks (G(Xt)) will hit a ceiling and fall short of delivering enough
conservation. As shown by Figure 6 and Table 9, it is likely there also is a biophysical limit to
conservation, which should prevent this environmental service from being further encouraged
by incentives such as monetary payments (PES). When conservation is driven too far, as in the
REDD1 scenario (Table 8 and Table 9), it might end up turning the balance of carbon trading
loans negative. On the other hand, when it is traded off against compensation, as in the CDM
scenario, it deteriorates the balance of carbon trading loans even further. Quite often, economy-
wise price setting and policy-making grow apart from ecological conditions.
Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 5 and Figure 6 show how ecology could economically guide the
economy [32]. If this linkage should be fully accomplished, setting targets for reducing
deforestation would be grounded in biophysical, rather than in economic or political bearings.
Shifting from a deforestation avoidance approach to a forest stock maintenance one would
certainly be a step forward. While the former carries a misleadingly uneconomic meaning, the
latter brings forest conservation to the economic foreground. As avoiding deforestation
usually implies forgoing profit-making activities, it mistakenly underlies monetary rewards.
Thus, a great deal of the REDD mechanism draws heavily upon them. However, from a bio-
economic standpoint, they are most likely to become romantic red roses, whose purchase will,
rather than mend a broken heart, make money melt into thin air.
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